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Abstract: Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thou-
ghts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-cons-
ciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact 
that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns 
the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather 
than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analy-
se a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s approaches to self-cons-
ciousness, as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing 
the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes’s view 
on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as 
herself, while Hume’s seems to lack those features assigned to the conscious-
ness of self-as-subject.
Keywords: Self-consciousness, I-thoughts, first-person perspective, Descartes, Hume. 
Resumen: La autoconciencia puede ser entendida como la habilidad para lle-
var a cabo reflexiones sobre uno mismo, las cuales pueden ser descritas como 
los pensamientos sobre tu propia persona como “individuo”. La autoconciencia 
comprende dos características relacionadas entre sí: la primera tiene que ver 
con el hecho de que está basada en una perspectiva en primera persona, mien-
tras que la segunda tiene que ver con el hecho de que debe ser considerada 
como la conciencia del yo como sujeto en lugar de como objeto. El objetivo de 
este trabajo es analizar algunas cuestiones acerca del punto de vista de Des-
cartes y de Hume sobre la autoconciencia, ya que ambos filósofos introducen un 
método de acceso en primera persona a la dimensión subjetiva a través de un 
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enfoque introspectivo. La visión de Descartes sobre la autoconciencia pare-
ce incapaz de concebirla y reconocerla como tal, mientras que la de Hume 
parece carecer de las características asignadas a la conciencia como sujeto.
Palabras clave: autoconciencia, filosofía, perspectiva en primera perso-
na, Descartes, Hume
1. First-person perspective and the consciousness of the self as subject
The first-person perspective point can be explained by Baker 
(2000, 2013)’s approach. Two types of first-person perspectives can be dis-
tinguished: a rudimentary first-person perspective, manifested by many 
mammals and human infants, and a robust first-person perspective, mani-
fested by language users who master first-personal language. The latter 
is the conceptual capacity not only to recognize oneself as distinct from 
things other than oneself, but also to conceive oneself as oneself. A ro-
bust first-person perspective is what exactly marks the difference between 
a creature with a rudimentary first-person perspective who can only be 
conscious of the environment, and a fully self-conscious subject. As a mat-
ter of fact, a mature human subject with a robust first-person perspective 
can attribute to herself a first-person reference on the basis of a self-con-
cept, i.e., not only can she refer to herself in the first-person, but she can 
also attribute first-person reference to herself. 
A crucial distinction is made between making first-person reference 
(as when Pasquale says, “I am tall”) and attributing first-person reference 
(as when Mario says, “Pasquale wishes that he himself were tall”). With 
the latter case, Mario attributes to Pasquale a wish he would express by 
a first-person reference. The attribution of a first-person reference occurs 
in indirect discourse, in a “that-”clause following a psychological verb. The 
point is that a subject does not attribute first-person reference only to others 
but also to his own self, as when Pasquale says, “I wish that I were tall”. A 
subject thinking “I am tall” can distinguish herself from others; a subject 
thinking “I wish that I were tall” can conceptualize that distinction: she can 
think of herself as herself. This ability to attribute first-person reference to 
oneself is the manifestation of strong first-person phenomena. 
Following Baker (2013) and Matthews (1992), “I*” pronouns2 are 
used reflexively to pick out the subject from her own point of view: gi-
2. Castañeda (1966; 1967) employs an asterisk, or star, next to a pronoun (“he*”) to attribute 
first-person reference to someone else, as in “Pasquale believes that he* is tall. This sentence 
is not true unless Pasquale expresses his belief in the first person: “I am tall.” Matthews 
(1992) introduces the “I*” for sentences with first-person subjects in order to analyse the 
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ven the close relation between the linguistic and the mental dimensions, 
I*-sentences are sentences containing “I*”, whereas I*-thoughts are thou-
ghts expressible by I*-sentences. By an I*-thought a subject conceives her-
self as herself*, and needs no third person referential device, such as a 
name, description, or demonstrative to identify herself. As we will see in 
the paragraphs 2 and 3, certain semantic and epistemic features of the 
term/concept I3 can be identified in this subject’s capacity of self-identifi-
cation: essential indexicality and immunity to error thorough misidenti-
fication. The former is relative to the meaning of the term/concept I, any 
expression of self-awareness being based on indexical terms such as “I” or 
“me”; the latter, on the other hand, refers to the fact that some singular 
judgments involving the self-ascription of mental (and physical, as will be 
seen) properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to 
the first-person pronoun (IEM). The subject formulating such judgments 
in given epistemic contexts cannot be mistaken as to whether it is he him-
self who is attributing a particular mental property to his own self. 
At the same time the basic self-consciousness at issue here is also 
to be regarded as the consciousness of self-as-subject, or subject self-aware-
ness, rather than the consciousness of the self as object. Following Kriegel 
(2003, 2007), it is possible to make a distinction between the conscious-
ness of oneself qua object and the consciousness of oneself qua subject. 
For instance, Mario can be conscious of Naples: Mario is the subject of 
the thought, and Naples its object. Mario, however, can also be conscious 
of himself*: in this case, Mario is both subject and object of the thought. 
Even though there is one single entity, and the subject and object of the 
thought are the same thing, it is possible to draw a conceptual distinction 
between Mario’s ability as object of thought and Mario’s ability as subject 
of thought: namely, the concepts of self-as-subject and self-as-object. The 
self as subject may be thus interpreted as the thing that does the thinking, 
whereas the consciousness of oneself as subject is the consciousness of one-
self as the thing doing the thinking. 
It seems clear that the first-person perspective and the conscious-
ness of self as subject are two interdependent features, the one being the 
condition of the other and vice versa. The subject’s manifestation of strong 
first-person phenomena – one’s ability to attribute first-person reference 
to herself – is based on the subject’s possibility of being the consciousness 
of herself as the thing doing the thinking, and the subject’s consciousness 
phenomena expressed by “I think that I* am F”.
3. I have developed the issue in XXXXX (2017).
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of self-as-subject cannot be gained unless the subject exhibits a manifesta-
tion of strong first-person phenomena.
As has been just said, such two features defining the notion of basic 
self-consciousness are grounded on a few epistemic and semantic peculia-
rities in the ability to use the term or concept I in de se or I-thoughts: the 
essential indexicality and the immunity to error through misidentifica-
tion. These will be discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3.
2. Indexicality
As has already been said, an I*-thought allows an individual to refer 
to herself as herself* without a need for third-person referential devices, 
such as names, descriptions, or demonstratives, to identify herself: the term/
concept ‘I’ employed in a self-conscious or I*-thought is essentiality indexi-
cal4; as such, it necessarily involves information indexed to the context and 
– more specifically – to the thinker who has produced the thought. In detail, 
(a) ‘I’ is a singular term/concept, that is, a term with a single indi-
vidual as its reference; 
(b) this term is governed by the token-reflexive rule, whereby every 
token of ‘I’ refers to the subject who has produced or used it, either men-
tally or linguistically; 
(c) with the information available in context, and once the circum-
stances of evaluation are established, prima facie this rule is sufficient to 
determine its reference5. 
More importantly, the indexical information about oneself based 
on the use of the term/concept ‘I’ cannot be reduced to non-indexical infor-
mation; for this reason, indexicality is essential. Two well-known examples 
by Perry (1977) describe the matter at issue. 
The first example regards a fictional character named Rudolf Lin-
gens: “An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford library. He 
reads a number of things in the library, including a biography of himself, 
and a detailed account of the library in which he is lost. […] He still won’t 
know who he is, and where he is, no matter how much knowledge he piles 
up, until that moment when he is ready to say, This place is aisle five, floor 
six, of Main Library, Stanford. I am Rudolf Lingens”. Amnesiac Rudolf 
Lingens can gather all sorts of information about himself by reading the 
4.  Cf. Kaplan (1989) and Perry’s (1997, 594) classic approaches.
5.  This approach to indexicality has been acknowledged by major scholars. Nonetheless, this 
position is not entirely uniform, cf. de Gaynesford (2006) for an analysis of the debate.
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books in the Library, and yet no such information can provide him with 
the missing conceptual tool he needs to link the information with himself. 
In other words, there is no logical connection between third-person des-
criptive information, no matter how detailed, and a first-person grasp of 
oneself through the use of ‘I’.
The second example regards indexical judgements (beliefs and 
desires), which are crucial to explain and predict the motivating action: 
“I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart 
down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, 
seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. 
With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed 
unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was tr-
ying to catch” (Perry, 1979). 
In the example, Perry’s thoughts (a) “the shopper with the torn sack 
is making a mess” and (b) “I am making a mess” refer to the same indivi-
dual, so two intrinsically different kinds of self-reference are at play here. 
In the former, self-reference is external and available in the third person 
only: Mario can refer to an object by using a name, a definite description or 
a demonstrative, and the object he is referring to might be himself; there 
is no difference between this kind of self-reference and the reference made 
to an object that is different from oneself. An external self-reference can 
occur without the subject’s realizing he is referring to himself, as in the 
first thought formulated by Perry, where he does not realize he is the very 
shopper with the torn sack who is making a mess. 
Instead, the internal self-reference expressed by the second thought 
(b) “I am making a mess” produces an authentic I-thought that is only ac-
cessible from a first-person perspective because it is based on the use of ‘I’. 
As soon as he realizes that he is the shopper at issue, Perry produces a new 
thought, which he terms locating belief, based on the use of the essential 
mental indexical ‘I’. This entails that the ascription of an authentic I-thou-
ght to one’s own self cannot be achieved without the concept ‘I’ as there is 
no way to think an I-thought other than through indexical reference; hence, 
I-thoughts are irreducible to the other kind of non-indexical thoughts.
Accordingly, by articulating an I-thought in a propositional way, an 
I-thought will contain a content whose subjective essential indexical refe-
rence is expressible in the natural language by the personal pronoun ‘I’. 
This thought can be reported in either direct or indirect form: while the for-
mer is in oratio recta and reports the above-mentioned example as in (1) “I 
am making a mess” (thought by Perry), in the indirect form the thought can 
be expressed in oratio obliqua, and the report will be in the third person: (2) 
“Perry thinks that he himself is making a mess”. In turn, this sentence can 
be interpreted as the report of yet another thought still: (3) “Perry thinks 
Luca Forgione
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that Perry is making a mess”. Obviously, it is possible to employ a definite 
description, “the φ” that picks out Perry uniquely, as in this example: (4) 
“Perry thinks that the author of The Essential Indexical is making a mess”.
The thought expressed in (1) is neither equivalent to (3) nor (4). 
With cases (3) and (4), Perry might be amnesiac and neither remember his 
name nor his being the author of The Essential Indexical. It is only in (1) 
that an authentic I-thought is present: the subject who thinks the thought 
“I am making a mess”, provided that she knows the rule associated with 
‘I’, cannot use it without realizing that she is referring to nobody but her-
self. Although (1) and (3) or (4) are not equivalent, prima facie (2) seems 
to be a report of both. To capture the difference, Castañeda employs two 
different uses of the third person pronouns in oratio obliqua sentences. In 
the first case, to make (2) equivalent to (1), the pronoun is to be used in an 
indirect reflexive modality (Anscombe, 1975) or as a quasi-indicator – the 
above-mentioned artificial pronoun (‘she*’, ‘he*’, ‘it*’) introduced by Casta-
ñeda (1966, 1967, 1968) to attribute a first-person essential indexical use 
from a third-person angle: (2.1) “Perry thinks that he* himself is making 
a mess”. The quasi-indicator “he*” in the example is used as an anaphora, 
and its reference is not determined directly but only through the proposi-
tional attitude subject. In the other case, assuming that Perry is amnesiac, 
to make (2) equivalent to (3) “he” will not be employed as a quasi-indicator 
but as a simple indexical; thus, (2) is the report of Perry’s belief that so-
meone else in the context (named Perry too) is making a mess: Perry has 
not realized that it is he* himself who is doing that.
What matters here it’s the fact that token-reflexive expressions 
such as first-person pronouns and quasi-indicators are essential indexi-
cals: they can be neither eliminated nor replaced by a name, description, 
or demonstrative without losing the content expressed by the sentences/
thoughts that contain them: to refer to (to think of) oneself qua oneself, the 
subject has to use the essential indexical ‘I’. Therefore I-thoughts make up 
an irreducible class of mental phenomena.
3. Immunity to error through misidentification
In a well-known passage, Wittgenstein (1958, 66-7) introduces his 
philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I, whe-
re he identifies two types of uses, i.e., ‘I’ used as object (“I have grown six 
inches”) and ‘I’ used as subject (“I have toothache”): “One can point to the 
difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first ca-
tegory involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these 
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cases the possibility of an error... On the other hand there is no question of 
recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are you sure it’s 
you who have pains?’ would be nonsensical”.
This passage should be taken as part of the philosophical fra-
mework articulated by Wittgenstein since the 1930s according to some 
theses (some of which will be examined in Chapter 4) to be regarded as 
the background for the analyses of the two uses of ‘I’. While the I used as 
object performs a referential function relative to one’s body and physical 
features in general, the I used as subject apparently regards mental states 
and processes involving no subject identification.
Particular judgments displaying first-person reference (e.g., “I 
have pain”) display what Shoemaker (1968, 565) defines self-reference wi-
thout identification: “My use of the word ‘I’ as the subject of my statement 
is not due to my having identified as myself something of which I know, or 
believe, or wish to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to it”. 
The self-ascription of the thoughts on which the self-consciousness is ba-
sed regards the consciousness of oneself qua subject – namely, as the sub-
ject of every thought or mental state – rather than as the object based on 
the previous identification. Due to the absence of any identification compo-
nent, particular singular judgments involving the self-ascription of mental 
(and physical, as will be seen) properties are immune to error through mi-
sidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM). For example, if 
a subject feels pain and judges ‘I am in pain’, the subject formulating such 
judgments cannot be mistaken as to the person who happens to be in pain.
To make this point clear, we might consider an example of iden-
tification-dependent thought, e.g., Babis’s thought that his neighbour is 
a nice person. Following Evans (1982) and Kriegel (2007), the structure 
of this thought consists of an identification component and a predication 
component, which can be explained by Babis’s first-person perspective as 
follows: “my neighbour [identification component] is a person who smiles 
at me every day and the person who smiles at me every day is a nice per-
son [predication component]”. Here, two types of errors are possible. Babis 
can be mistaken as to the predicational component, i.e., that his neighbour 
is a nice person: for example, later on Babis finds out that his neighbour’s 
tendency to smile is nothing more than a cynical strategy to have him 
consent to cut the trees in the garden. Babis can also be mistaken as far 
as the identificational component is concerned – i.e., with respect to the 
person who is his neighbour – and, for example, get confused and mistake 
the mailman for his neighbour.
On the other hand, there is a class of self-ascriptions involving 
no identification-dependent thoughts; as such, it is not subject to error 
through misidentification. Shoemaker (1968, 565) examines the kinds of 
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psychological predicates involved in such self-ascriptions: “There is an im-
portant and central class of psychological predicates, let us call them P* 
predicates, each of which can be known to be instantiated in such a way 
that knowing it to be instantiated in that way is equivalent to knowing it 
to be instantiated in oneself”. For instance, the judgment “I have pain” is 
IEM because the way in which the predicate is expressed (“there is pain”), 
that is, based on our own subjective experience, will suffice to realize that 
it is ascribed to ourselves (“I have pain”). It is in this particular sense that 
“there is pain” is tantamount to “I have pain”.
Evans, in turn, goes beyond the terms of the matter as suggested 
by Wittgenstein and, to some extent, by Shoemaker. In particular self-as-
criptions, the self-reference is direct and unmediated: as Evans notes, this 
is identification-free self-reference. More to the point, and moving from the 
self-ascription of properties that are not only mental but also physical, the 
author discloses his approach: judgments are IEM when they result from 
the connection between the information acquired in the first person and 
its justification, as opposed to identification-dependent judgments involved 
in the ordinary perception of external objects. The IEM feature does not 
depend on the kind of predicate involved in the self-ascription but on the 
epistemic and justification ground on which the subject produces such ju-
dgments in a context where – from Strawson’s lesson onward – the subject 
is conceived as a spatio-temporally located object.
In particular, Evans (1982, 220) contends that a judgment such as 
“I am F” is identification-free unless it corresponds to the inferential conclu-
sion drawn from the two premises, i.e., “a is F” (predication component) and 
“I am a” (identification component). Such a judgment is based on the unme-
diated self-ascription of properties through the introspective consciousness 
(as is the case with mental properties) or proprioception (as with physical 
properties). For example, according to our general capacity to perceive bo-
dies and to our sense of proprioception, of balance, of heat and cold, and 
of pressure, the kind of information generated by each of these modes of 
perception seems to give rise to immune to error through misidentification 
judgments: “None of the following utterances appears to make sense when 
the first component expresses knowledge gained in the appropriate way: 
‘Someone’s legs are crossed, but is it my legs that are crossed?’ ”.
Therefore, the self-consciousness capacity depends on the possibi-
lity to produce I-thoughts, which employ indexical self-reference immune 
to error through misidentification relative to the term/concept I. As said 
before, paragraph 4 will examine some considerations on Descartes and 
Hume’s views on self-consciousness as both of them introduce a first-per-
sonal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspec-
tive account. While Descartes’s view of self-consciousness seems unable 
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to conceive and recognize oneself as oneself*, Hume’s seems to lack the 
features assigned to the consciousness of the self as subject. 
4. Descartes and Hume on I-thoughts
In Meditations on First Philosophy, with his famous cogito argu-
ment Descartes introduces an introspective account of self-awareness. Ha-
ving employed the methodological and rational doubt to be sceptical about 
all kinds of knowledge and opinions commonly held to be true, Descartes 
does not build his argument in its standard formulation (cogito ergo sum), 
but through certain logically equivalent steps aimed at demonstrating 
that, even when in doubt, the subject cannot doubt about the doubting 
itself, as she cannot question the existence of the thinking that manifests 
itself in the mental sphere.
The verb cogitare and the mentalist verbs employed are in the 
first person because the existence of the thinking is only undoubted from a 
first-person perspective. Since the subject is conscious of her own thoughts, 
she can conquer this certainty inside her mental sphere: whenever a mental 
activity is given, and whatever its nature (hoping, doubting, willing, etc.), the 
subject captures it as well as its existence through intuition to specify the in-
trospective account of self-awareness by means of an acquaintance method6.
In metaphysical terms, thought is the essential nature of the mind: 
“I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot 
6. Going through the steps that outline the Cartesian distinction between deduction, i.e., the 
inference of something that necessarily follows from other propositions that are known with 
certainty, and intuition, i.e., the faculty by which it is possible to capture the initial certainty 
of a proposition in an immediate and self-evident way to make deduction possible, Markie 
(1992, 145) asserts that in the cogito argument Descartes’s use of intuition is based on two 
different types of intuition: “The set of intuited propositions includes both self-evident propo-
sitions not inferred from any others and propositions immediately inferred from self-evident 
premises”. Propositions about mental states are self-evident and not inferred from others 
– i.e., they are intuitive in a narrow sense – while propositions about one’s existence are im-
mediately inferred from propositions about mental states, i.e., they are intuitive in a broad 
sense. In support of this argument the author shows several Cartesian passages (e.g., his 
replies to Mersenne’s objections) where he refers to lumen naturale, ratio naturalis, and clear 
distinct perceptions as criteria to explain his certainty about the thinking and its existence. 
There are, however, several problems related to The Self-Evident Intuition/Immediate In-
ference Interpretation: Markie himself reformulates his argument to reconcile the contrast 
between the passages where Descartes explicitly refers to the two senses of intuition as the 
grounds of the cogito argument and those claiming the need for prior knowledge of the gener-
al proposition for which it is impossible for what thinks not to exist (for example, cf. the tenth 
article of the first part of the Principles of philosophy). A syllogistic structure of the cogito 
argument is thus maintained (cf. Williams, 1978). Other commentators bring into question 
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be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just 
when I think” (Descartes 1641, 51-2). The Cartesian approach is based on 
the shift from an epistemic to a metaphysical argument; on the one hand, 
the former concerns how the subject represents herself as a thinking enti-
ty in the mental sphere. In the Twentieth century this has sometimes been 
discussed – in particular to be dismissed – as a form of privileged access 
(cf. supra): each subject accesses her mind in an infallible way compared to 
how she accesses external objects, including her own body. The second ar-
gument, on the other hand, identifies two distinct substances: res cogitans 
and res extensa7. In this manner Descartes (1641, 20-1) assigns a special 
role to self-awareness to achieve his metaphysical results: 
But what therefore am I? A thinking thing. What is that? I mean a thing that 
doubts, that understands, that affirms, that denies, that wishes to do this and does 
not wish to do that, and also that imagines and perceives by the senses. Well, indeed, 
there is quite a lot there, if all these things really do belong to me. But why should 
they not belong to me? Is it not me who currently doubts virtually everything, who 
nonetheless understands something, who affirms this alone to be true, and denies 
the rest, who wishes to know more, and wishes not to be deceived, who imagines 
many things, even against his will, and is aware of many things that appear to come 
via the senses? Is there any of these things that is not equally true as the fact that I 
exist—even if I am always asleep, and even if my creator is deceiving me to the best 
of his ability? Is there any of them that can be distinguished from my thinking? Is 
there any that can be said to be separate from me? For that it is I that am doubting, 
understanding, wishing, is so obvious that nothing further is needed in order to exp-
lain it more clearly.
This passage reveals that the various mental activities (doubting, 
understanding, etc.) belong to a thinking substance that should be unders-
tood as an I (“it is I that am doubting, understanding, wishing”): there is 
no mental activity without an ego, i.e., without a subject performing such 
the very possibility of inferring the existence of the subject from the consciousness of thought, 
cf. Kenny (1968, 169), Wilson (1978, 55), and, obviously, Hintikka (1962). For an effective 
critique to Hintikka’s non-inferential reading of the cogito argument, cf. Bonomi (1991, 19): 
his reading is similar to Markie’s (1986, 1992) in some respects, especially when he focuses 
on the particularly plain inferences highlighted by Descartes, also regarding the cogito, that 
can be grasped intuitively to affirm the compatibility between the inferential nature of the 
cogito and its intuitive character.
7.  Cf. Kenny (1968), Hooker (1978, 171-4) and his Descartes’s Argument from Doubt. Having 
gained the certainty of the cogito’s existence, the criterion employed by Descartes to assume 
an ontological dualism is, so to speak, external: once its existence is demonstrated, in the 
sixth meditation Descartes refers to God and relies on the fact that he will not deceive about 
the clear and distinct perception of the self as a thinking and unextended substance, estab-
lishing the intrinsic property of the mind which is ontologically different from the extended 
body; the immaterial essence of the ego is thus identified.
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an activity8. The metaphysical connection between the I and the thoughts 
is nothing but an example of the metaphysical relationship between a 
substance and its attributes. An argument challenged by Hume, as will 
be seen further on. As a matter of fact, in his reply to one of Hobbes’s ob-
jections, Descartes (1641, 110) points out that “it is certain that thought 
cannot exist without a thinking thing, nor can any act or any accident at 
all exist without a substance in which it inheres”.
If the link between a substance and its attributes is metaphysically 
obvious, then the relation between a thinking substance understood as ego 
and the thoughts from which the Cartesian approach to self-consciousness 
can be characterized is far more complex. When the subject turns her gaze 
inwards, that is, to the mental sphere, what she grasps through the cons-
cious dimension are thoughts, i.e., the attributes of the substance she is 
thinking of: generally speaking, if a substance cannot be captured in itself, 
but always and only through the attributes that are inherent in it, when 
a subject turns her gaze toward the mental sphere she does not capture a 
substance in itself, but only the thoughts that are inherent in the thinking 
substance (cf. Markie 1992, 171; Wilson 1978, 66).
If, on the one hand, this plainly means that to be self-conscious 
one needs appeal to the metaphysical sphere and to the res cogitans itself, 
on the other – and less plainly – the only reference to the metaphysical 
thinking substance will not be as sufficient a condition: it will not suffice 
to justify Descartes’s certainly innovative use of the term ‘I’ to refer, as a 
thinking substance, to himself as himself* without any conceptual media-
tion (“it is I that am doubting, understanding, wishing, is so obvious that 
nothing further is needed in order to explain it more clearly”).
Beyond the objection made by Lichtenberg in the Eighteenth cen-
tury, that what Descartes can actually state is “there is a thought”, rather 
than “I’m thinking” (at the time, an objection resumed by logical empiri-
cists such as Mach and criticized by Williams, 1978), it is exactly in the 
8. And there is no thought without an awareness of thinking: the consciousness is an intrinsic 
feature of thought. The argument is present in Locke but is neither implied in Leibniz nor 
in Kant, who employs Leibniz’s notion of petits perceptions through Wolff and Meier’s dun-
kle Vorstellungen to assume the possibility of unconscious mental representations. Although 
a few commentators have tried to soften the rigid Cartesian identification of thought and 
consciousness by referring to other passages of his works (cf. Gombay 2007, 122-3), it is in 
the context of the Meditations on First Philosophy, if nowhere else, that Descartes seems 
straightforward on this point: when he replies, for example, to Arnauld’s objections, “there 
can be no thought in us of which, at the moment at which it is in us, we are not conscious” 
(1641, 158). This point had already been stated earlier in his replies to the second objections: 
“I use the term thought to cover everything that is in us in such a way that we are immedi-
ately conscious of it” (1641, 102).
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terms of self-awareness that the link between the thinking substance un-
derstood as an I and the thoughts seems to be problematic.
A subject captures the thoughts in the mental sphere, and this may 
be properly reported by the statement “the thought is ongoing”9. As a conse-
quence, the subject can only come to the conclusion that “the thing with this 
thinks”, where “this” refers to the thought in course rather than to “I think”. 
Nonetheless, a full self-conscious capacity can be expressed only through 
first-person assertions such as those used by Descartes: the question is how 
Descartes, beside a few sporadic references to the concept ‘I’, justifies the 
fact that thoughts captured in the conscious sphere are not the attributes of 
some thinking substance but his very attributes, which can be related to a 
particular thinking substance which turns out to be himself. 
In this respect the Cartesian approach does not offer an explicit 
characterization of the indexical thought in order to constitute I*-thoughts 
or de se assertions10, nor does it put forward an exhaustive explanation 
of the subject’s ability to identify himself as himself based on the mere 
presence of the thought summarized by the statement “the thing with this 
(thought) thinks”. Markie (1992, 164) offers the following example to clari-
fy the Cartesian difficulties:
Suppose that he [Descartes] considers one of his ideas, does not yet know whether 
he has produced it or whether God has produced it in him, and decides that whatever 
has produced it is perfect. Suppose too that he is the source of the idea. Clearly, the 
thought that Descartes would express by “The thing that produced this is perfect”, 
where “this” refers to the idea, is not the same as the one he would express by “I am 
perfect”. He believes the former but he may not believe the latter. The difference be-
tween the thoughts is that, although Descartes thinks of himself in each thought – he 
is the referent of both “the thing that produced this” and of “I” – in the first thought 
he only thinks of himself and in the second he thinks of himself as himself. This di-
fference between the two thoughts is lost, if we analyze the thought Descartes would 
express by “I am perfect” as the one he would express by “The thing that has this is 
perfect”, where “this” again refers to the idea.
In the first book of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume (1739-
40, 364) dismisses the idea that the subject can perceive a persistent self 
9.  This suggests yet another argument still for a syllogistic interpretation of the cogito: from 
the general principle for which any observed quality belongs to a substance, and given a 
thought caught in the conscious sphere, the subject infers that a thinking substance does ex-
ist. Nonetheless, Markie (1992) develops this argument in the terms of his The Self-Evident 
Intuition/Immediate Inference Interpretation through a few epistemological distinctions. Be-
sides, on several occasions Descartes himself argues that the cogito is not based on a syllo-
gism: obviously, as Markie and Bonomi’s interpretations suggest, the non-syllogistic nature 
of the cogito does not imply its non-inferentiality.
10. The debate on Descartes and self-reference is obviously vast and offers different positions, 
e.g., Anscombe (1975), Van Cleve (1983), Zemach (1985), Markie (1986, 1992).
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through the introspective consciousness to eventually suggest an elusive 
epistemic thesis:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stum-
ble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, 
and never can observe any thing but the perception.
Hume’s approach fits into the framework of a science of human 
nature which is grounded on both the experimental method and the New-
tonian principles to explain the genesis of mental events and the associa-
tion of ideas according to the principles of resemblance, contiguity, and 
causation. Perceptions are divided into impressions and ideas, simple and 
complex, deriving from sensation and reflection. While impressions of sen-
sations cause ideas – which are to be distinguished in their being weaker 
images of impressions – ideas, in turn, cause impressions of reflexion: pas-
sions, desires, and emotions.
Hume tackles a form of introspective self-consciousness based on 
what Locke terms “inner sense” (cf. supra), its operations being, mutatis 
mutandis, similar to those involved in the perception of external objects. 
He challenges the assumption of the subject’s encountering the idea or 
impression of herself in the flow of psychological perceptions in much the 
same way she encounters the idea or impression of red in the perception of 
the external world (cf. Stroud, 1977, 118). Such a result is chiefly reached 
to criticise the philosophical notion of substance: perceptions should be 
conceived as separable, distinguishable, and different – to Hume, they can 
perfectly exist without something like a substance to support them. Fai-
ling the notion of substance and the associated distinction between subs-
tance and accidents, the metaphysical conception of the self as substance 
with thoughts as its accidents dissolves, to be replaced by the well-known 
theory of the mind as a bundle of perceptions.
With Chisholm (1976, 38), the Humean thesis is articulated as fo-
llows: 1. I cannot be directly aware of any object unless that object is an 
impression; 2. but I am not an impression; 3. therefore I cannot be directly 
aware of myself. The first premise stems from his criticism of the notion of 
substance and the distinction between substance and accident: to Hume, 
one can only deal with mental particulars, impressions and sensations, as 
no idea of substance is distinct from that of a collection of particular quali-
ties. If an impression is required for an idea to be produced, then, according 
to the second premise, no impression of an ego can form its idea: “self or 
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person is not any one impression” (Hume, 1739-40, 263)11. If there were any 
such thing as an impression attributable to a self, then at least this should 
be constant: assuming that the self exists, it must exist in a constant, inva-
riable way. To Hume, however, in the flow of perception no impression stays 
unaltered, least of all when it relates to a self. It follows that if the subject 
is only conscious of impressions, and if no impression is related to the self, 
then the subject cannot be conscious of herself in the flow of perception.
At the same time, we may reach a metaphysical thesis of exclusion: 
the thinking subject is no substantial object in the world. This thesis is 
obtained as a conclusion of the previous elusive epistemic thesis: given 
that, in introspection, the thinking subject cannot manifest itself to itself 
nor can be known as an object (epistemic argument), then the subject is no 
substantial object (metaphysical thesis).
From a metaphysical perspective, what is denied here is the exis-
tence of a substantial ego, although this will not affect the very possi-
bility of self-consciousness, as pointed out by Frank (2004, 71): “Hume 
failed to realize that self-consciousness and ego-consciousness are not the 
same, so that the critique of Descartes’ substantialisation of the ego in 
no way shows the possibility of a knowledge of consciousness, and thus 
of self-consciousness, to be incoherent”. Firstly, it is precisely through 
self-consciousness that the eliminative conclusion about the substantial 
ego can be attained: after all, it is exactly when he most intimately enters 
what he refers to as “myself” that Hume comes to the conclusion of his me-
rely stumbling on a few particular perceptions12. Secondly, having rejected 
a substantialist perspective of the self upon which the psychological flow 
of thoughts ultimately depends, Hume (1739-40, 263-4) puts forward the 
famous argument of the bundle of perceptions:
I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle 
or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. […] The mind is a kind of thea-
tre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, 
glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is 
11. Here it is already possible to bring up the vicious circularity objection proposed by 
Noonan (1999, 193), who questions how Hume can take for granted that the self is no impres-
sion whatsoever, since he does not know what it really is: “If Hume has no idea of a self he 
presumably has no conception of what it would be like to observe one. In that case, however, 
how does he know that he is not doing so? Maybe he is, but just fails to recognize the fact”.
12. Chisholm (1976, 40) also finds a problem in this particular argument by Hume: “As Pro-
fessor Price once observed, it looks very much as though the self that Hume professed to be 
unable to find is the one that he finds to be stumbling – to be stumbling on to different per-
ceptions. How can he say that he doesn’t find himself – if he is correct in saying that he finds 
himself to be stumbling and, more fully, that he finds himself to be stumbling on certain and 
not to be stumbling on certain other things?”.
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properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different.
The thesis is entirely built on the reification of perception, unders-
tood as an entity independent of any substance from both a logical and 
ontological point of view, as remarked by Noonan (1999, 197): 
the relation between the self and its perceptions is analogous to that between 
the sea and its waves. The waves are modifications of the sea and perceptions are 
modifications of the self. But Hume, in claiming that perceptions are logically ontolo-
gically independent, denies this and thus denies the only possible basis for regarding 
the self, qua perceiver, as ontologically prior to its perceptions. That he should claim 
that the self is in reality nothing but a bundle of its perceptions […] is thus entirely 
intelligible. Once perceptions are reified as substances no other conception of the self 
makes any sense at all.
Beyond the issues concerned with circularity, self-awareness is 
understood as the exercise of a mind regarded as a bundle of perceptions 
producing the illusion of a self, the fictitious product of the flow of per-
ception13. Hume’s approach to self-awareness is based on an intrinsically 
observational, introspective account and, as such, is dismissed by those 
who regard basic self-consciousness as the consciousness of oneself as sub-
ject. This introspective account cannot account for the most fundamental 
type of self-consciousness – i.e., subject self-consciousness – but only ob-
ject self-awareness at best. If an introspective account of self-awareness 
identifies the ‘I’ with the subject qua thing known through the properties 
observed within the introspective awareness, rather than with the subject 
qua knower, or introspector, then the subject can only be seen as the object 
of awareness, not as the thing doing the thinking.
It is worth noting that both Descartes and Hume’s approaches are 
based on an introspective account of self-awareness; however, while Des-
cartes employs an acquaintance account of introspection, Hume relies on 
an observational explanation. Despite the important difference in the way 
13.  This does not remove another difficulty that Hume acknowledges not being able to sur-
mount: how to justify the genesis of this illusion according to given psychological rules. In the 
appendix to the third book of the Treatise dated 1740, Hume claims his inability to reconcile 
the principles that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences and that the mind 
never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences, failing to provide an adequate 
explanation for the genesis of the idea of a self understood as a simple and identical refer-
ence; cf. Stroud (1977), Noonan (1999). At the same time, this problematic picture contrasts 
with the analysis of passions and morality in the second and third books, where the role of 
the ego is established without any uncertainty, given its importance for the explanation of 
the moral action, among others.
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the subject introspectively reflects on her own thoughts in the two accounts, 
according to the core conception of introspectivism, basic self-consciousness 
is the consciousness of oneself as the thing with the thought being intros-
pected – namely, as the thing with this thought. In other words, thanks to 
the introspected thought the introspecting subject recognizes herself as the 
owner of the introspected thought or as the thing with the thought she in-
trospects. In the following passage, Shoemaker shows how an introspective 
account of self-awareness presents important difficulties, for the reason that 
it cannot explain how the subject cannot misidentify himself, i.e., how ‘I’ 
judgments are immune to error through misidentification (although his ob-
jection is mainly addressed to the inner sense account, his argument could 
also be used against Descartes’s approach, cf. supra):
[I]f the supposition that the perception [of my properties] is by “inner sense” is 
supposed to preclude the possibility of misidentification, presumably this must be 
because it guarantees that the perceived self would have a property, namely, the 
property of being an object of my inner sense, which no self other than myself could 
(logically) have and by which I could infallibly identify it as myself. But of course, in 
order to identify a self as myself by its possession of this property, I would have to 
know that I observe it by inner sense, and this self-knowledge, being the ground of my 
identification of the self as myself, could not itself be grounded on that identification. 
(Shoemaker 1968, 562–563) 
In conclusion, the consciousness of oneself as the thing with “this 
thought” cannot be seen as basic self-consciousness: it depends on a sub-
ject’s prior self-awareness, which the introspective account does not ma-
nage to explain – what Shoemaker defines “the ground of my identification 
of the self as myself”.
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